01 · Defense & federal suppliers
Parts you can explain to an auditor
Defense programs and the suppliers behind them need trusted
silicon: a controlled supply chain, secure RF behavior,
attestation, and export-controlled feature handling. MCN-1 is
being designed around a controlled provisioning route —
signed images, attestation evidence, and compliance artifacts
— with sensitive firmware paths kept private and
access-controlled.
Includes machine shops and manufacturers moving toward CMMC.
02 · Critical infrastructure
Provenance as a procurement requirement
Critical-infrastructure buyers are being pushed by risk reviews
and tightening cyber rules toward verifiable hardware roots of
trust and cleaner provenance. The MCN-1 direction —
hardware identity, measured boot, attestation of what is actually
running — is built to answer exactly those reviews.
03 · Industrial OEMs & robotics
Built for products that live for years
Industrial OEMs and robotics teams live with a part long after
launch. The OEM lane is being designed for production-grade
modules, a secure firmware lifecycle, provisioning APIs,
controlled customization, and deeper integration support under
commercial agreements.
04 · Medical devices
The same scrutiny, different reviewers
Connected medical devices face the same supply-chain and
software-provenance questions as defense and infrastructure
programs. A radio with a verifiable root of trust and signed,
attestable firmware gives device teams evidence to bring to
their own reviews.
05 · Makers & open source
ESP32-style usability, kept honest
Developers get public boards and modules, an open SDK, examples,
migration guides, register and API documentation, and signed
update tools as they are ready. RF firmware stays a signed
component with public hashes and attestation — not an
uncontrolled stack, and not a mystery either.